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Introduction
Copyright law protects not only works created by individuals and
commercial entities, but also some governmental works.' Under
section 105 of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection is not
available for works of the United States government.2 However, no
similar prohibition exists for works of state and local governments.
In fact, under existing principles of international copyright law,
copyright subsists in works of state governments unless state statutes
or statutory interpretations provide otherwise. The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, joined by the
United States in 1989, removes registration requirements for
copyright protection.' This means that copyright exists in literary or
artistic works, including governmental works, from the moment of
their inception, unless statutory or common law provides to the
contrary.
Copyright of state governments in primary law materials, such as
statutory compilations and court reports, have the potential to restrict
public access to legal documents of vital importance. For instance, if a
state claims a copyright interest in its statutory code, citizens would
not be able to reproduce the statutory text with notes and annotations
without first securing permission from a governmental body and
possibly having to pay royalties to the state.
Many state governments now make their statutory and legislative
materials accessible on the Internet. However, if protected by
copyright, these materials could not be freely reproduced or
downloaded from the Internet. Copyright protection of state codes
would prevent Internet users from posting parts of the code on their
own Internet sites, and it could even prohibit hyper-linking to specific
statutory provisions within the code.
Meanwhile, there are no comprehensive studies of state laws
1. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const.
art. I § 8, cl. 8. Therefore, the Constitution's copyright clause does not exclude
governmental works from copyright protection.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000 Supp.). "Copyright protection under this article is not
available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States
Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by
assignment, bequest, or otherwise."
3. "The enjoyment and the exercise of these [copyright] rights shall not be subject to
any formality .... Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention art. 5
(2) (Paris, July 5 to 24, 1971).
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providing for copyright protection of primary law materials. In fact,
legal scholar John A. Kidwell spoke of "an almost astonishing lack of
authority to guide one to an answer."' Authors of copyright treatises
say in unison that copyright protection should not be available for
state statutes and judicial opinions because of public policy
considerations.! However, none of the authors cite or interpret
specific provisions from state laws that claim copyright interest in
statutory compilations and court reports.
This article presents results of a comprehensive study of state
laws providing for copyright in primary law materials.6 The research
findings demonstrate that statutory codes in at least half of the fifty
states provide for state copyright in official statutory compilations,
court reports, or administrative regulations. The author found specific
statutory provisions by using a keyword search in the Lexis database
of state codes.7 In addition, the author searched through the table of
contents in individual state codes. Where available, the article
provides interpretation of statutory provisions by federal and state
courts, and in the state attorney general's opinions.
The article begins with an overview of the common law and
4. John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1021
(1989). Kidwell raised the question of potential conflict between state copyright ownership
and state open records laws. However, he did not answer the question saying that
copyright and open records laws differ dramatically from state to state, and it would be
virtually impossible to analyze them comprehensively.
5. For instance, Melville Nimmer writes in his authoritative treatise that, "it has long
been held that no copyright may be claimed in state court opinions" and state statutes.
Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.06[c] (Matthew Bender 2000). He reasons that
public has a due process right to have notice of what the law requires. Nimmer argues that
failure to observe such notice requirements would constitute a defense for one charged
with violation of the unpublicized law. See id.
Paul Goldstein writes that official legal documents, such as judicial opinions and
legislative enactments, are not copyrightable. He argues that the public must have free
access to official legal materials if the legal process is to function efficiently. Goldstein also
claims that government should not be allowed to use copyright as a tool for censoring the
publication of embarrassing information that appears in governmental documents. In
addition, Goldstein writes that, by securing copyright in its publications, government may
gain an unfair competitive advantage over commercial entities in the marketplace. Paul
Goldstein, Stella W. & Ira S. Lillick, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice vol. 1, § 2.5.2,
87-98 (Little, Brown and Co. 1989).
Similarly, William Patry admits that there is a public policy prohibition against copyright
in state statutes, judicial opinions and other government edicts. See William F. Patry,
Copyright Law and Practice vol. 1, ch. 3 (BNA 1994).
6. Most of the research was conducted in the spring of 2000.
7. The author searched the text of state statutes in all 50 states by using keywords
"copyright," "publication AND property." The author acknowledges the possibility that
this keyword search may not have identified all the relevant provisions in state laws.
federal statutory law regarding copyright protection of state primary
law materials. Part II presents the results of the statutory research,
accompanied by judicial interpretations of specific provisions, where
applicable. The article concludes with an analysis of findings and
suggestions for changes in the law.
I
Common Law and Public Policy on Copyright in Primary Law
Materials
A. Early Cases
The United States courts first confronted the question of
whether copyright exists in state laws and judicial opinions in the mid-
19th century. In the first copyright case decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1834, Wheaton v. Peters,8 the Justices stated in
dicta, that "no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written
opinions delivered by the court."9 The Court did not cite any legal
authority for such a prohibition. It ruled that a Supreme Court
reporter could not claim copyright in the Court reports without
following statutory formalities established by Congress for securing a
copyright.
In later cases, courts qualified this statement by holding that,
while no copyright exists in the basic text of judicial opinions and
state laws, publishers may claim copyright in the volumes of court
reports and annotated statutes. In the 1851 case of Little v. Gould" a
federal trial court in New York enjoined unauthorized publication of
state court decisions despite the state constitutional provision that
"judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person."'" The
court reasoned that while no copyright existed in judicial opinions of
the New York Court of Appeal, the state still could secure copyright
in the volumes of court reports." In particular, the state statute
provided protection for "notes and references," which included, in
the opinion of the court, the summary of cases, head-notes, footnotes,
and arguments of counsel. In holding so, the court protected a
commercial publisher's investment in printing a volume of reports.
The court stressed that no person was at liberty "to intercept and
8. 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
9. Id. at 668.
10. 15 Fed. Cas. 604 (N.D.N.Y. 1851).
11. Id. at 604.
12. Id.
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appropriate, or destroy, the just rewards of the enterprise, by
rapaciously seizing upon the book and re-printing it."13
In the 1886 case Davidson v. Wheelock, a federal trial court in
Minnesota announced the same principle for state statutes.4 The
court stated that while state laws are "public records, subject to
inspection by every one," copyright could subsist in the original
elements of statutory compilations, such as marginal notes and
references. 5 The court cited no legal authority for this rule.
In Banks & Bros. v. West Publg. Co., the same court relied on its
Davidson decision to hold that an official publisher of state court
reports could not prevent a competing company from printing state
court decisions.6 The court held that the public should have free
access to both state statutes and judicial opinions because judicial
opinions are binding upon all citizens as official interpretations of the
law. 7 The court relied on a "maxim of universal application that every
man is presumed to know the law" and therefore, everyone should
have free access to the law and its official interpretation. 8 The court
also stated, in the United States, "[e]ach citizen is a ruler, - a law-
maker, - and as such has the right of access to the laws he joins in
making and to any official interpretation thereof."'9 These maxims
were so obvious to the court that it did not support them with any
legal authority. In fact, the court recognized that all the common law
authority from England spoke to the contrary.'
In 1886 - the same year Banks & Bros. was decided - two courts
in other jurisdictions came to different conclusions regarding public
access to state judicial opinions. In Nash v. Lathrop, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held that a company publishing an authorized
series of Massachusetts Reports did not have the right to prevent
others from making copies of the state judicial opinions.2' The court
followed the reasoning of the Minnesota court, ruling that citizens
should have uninhibited access to the laws in stating that "[t]he
13. Id. at 607.
14. 27 F. 61 (D. Minn. 1886).
15. Id. (refusing to enjoin publication of the constitution and the laws of Minnesota
as revised and re-enacted by the legislature, the court held that an exclusive state contract
for publication of statutory law did not entitle the publisher to copyright in the text of the
laws.)
16. 27 F. 50 (D. Minn. 1886).
17. Id. at 57.
18. Id. at 57.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886).
decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions
and interpretations of the laws which are binding upon all citizens.,
22
In addition, the court stressed that it has always been customary for a
court reporter to allow free public access to the opinions and to
furnish copies upon reasonable compensation.23
To the contrary, in Gould v. Banks, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut ruled that a state court reporter was under no obligation
to furnish copies of court opinions to a weekly law magazine
publisher because doing so would breach a state contract for exclusive
publication of Connecticut Law Reports.2' Following English common
law, the court held that the state can lawfully hold a copyright in
opinions of the judges, since "[t]he judges and the reporter are paid
by the state, and the product of their mental labor is the property of
the state, and the state, as it might lawfully do, has taken to. itself the
copyright."25
In 1888, a federal trial court in New York disagreed with the
decision of Connecticut's highest state court. In the State of
Connecticut v. Gould, the New York court refused to issue an
injunction restraining publication of judicial opinions of the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, holding that judicial opinions
were free to the publication by "any person who chooses to use
them."26 The court relied on public policy considerations, that "in the
country where every person is presumed and required to know the
law,.., the fullest and earliest opportunity of access to the
expositions of the judicial tribunals should be afforded to all."'27
The United States Supreme Court brought clarity to the question
of whether copyright existed in judicial opinions in two 1888 cases. In
Banks v. Manchester, the publisher of Ohio State Reports sought to
enjoin unauthorized publication of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Ohio and the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.28 The Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the Ohio federal circuit court that
neither the State, nor the publisher could claim copyright in the
judicial opinions. 2' The Court stressed that, under the federal
Copyright Act of 1873, copyright could belong only to "a citizen of
22. Id. at 560.
23. Id. at 561.
24. 2 A. 886, 896 (Conn. 1886).
25. Id.
26. 34 F. 319 (C.C.N.Y. 1888).
27. Id.
28. 128 U.S. 244, 247 (1888).
29. Id. at 252.
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the United States or a resident therein."'3 The Court ruled that the
State did not qualify as "author" under the federal statute and,
therefore, could not secure copyright in its works.3' At the time, the
statutory definition of "author" did not include employers who hired
employees to produce copyrightable works.
The Court also relied on the public policy principle announced
earlier by federal courts in Minnesota, New York, and Ohio, that the
public should have access to laws that govern it: "The whole work
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and
interpretation of law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all ....32 In addition, the Court stated that the judges
could not have any pecuniary interest in their decisions, because the
States compensated them for their work.33 The Supreme Court thus
settled the question that copyright does not protect opinions of either
federal or state judges.
In Callaghan v. Myers, the Court re-iterated its stance that no
copyright exists in the opinions of judges, or "in the work done by
them in their official capacity as judges., 34 At the same time, the
Court recognized that copyright could subsist in the original
compilation materials added by publishers to the basic text of judicial
opinions.35 In Callaghan, the Court enjoined unauthorized publication
of Illinois state court decisions because a publisher copied head-notes,
indices, arrangement of cases, table of cases, and even errors from
several volumes of Illinois Reports.36 The Court held that a publisher
of court reports can secure copyright protection in "the matter which
is the result of his intellectual labor," such as the "division of the
reports into volumes, the numbering and paging of the volumes, the
table of cases cited in the opinions ... and the subdivision of the
",31index into appropriate, condensed titles ....
30. Id. at 253.
31. Id. ("The State cannot properly be called a citizen of the United States or a
resident therein... In no proper sense can the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares
the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note, be
regarded as their author or their proprietor... so as to be able to confer any title by
assignment to the State").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 667.
37. Id. at 649 (referring with approval to the lower court's decision and stating that
"as a general thing, there is but a small part of the report of a case which is the subject of
copyright.").
In 1898, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied
the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Manchester and
Callaghan to decide a case concerning copyright protection of
Michigan's annotated statutes.38 In Howell v. Miller, a publisher of
three volumes of Howell's Annotated Statutes claimed that state
officials and a competing publisher violated his exclusive rights in the
statutory compilation by printing new volumes of the general laws of
Michigan. 9 The court confirmed that Howell was entitled to a
copyright in the volumes of Annotated Statutes and that such
copyright covered "all in his books that may fairly be deemed the
result of his labors.""0 This would include marginal references, notes,
memoranda, table of contents, indices, digests of judicial opinions,
and head-notes."
However, the court ruled that the competing publisher did not
infringe Howell's copyright, because he copied only "the bare text of
the statutes and side-notes" without appropriating Howell's
annotations, index of statutes, or consecutive section numbering.42
The court stated that, "any person desiring to publish the statutes of a
state may use any copy of such statutes to be found in any printed
book, whether such book be the property of the state or the property
of an individual.
4 3
In the 1906 case Ex parte Brown, the Supreme Court of Indiana
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Manchester and
Callaghan to hold that the state could not monopolize publication of
court decisions by preventing a court clerk from distributing
uncertified, carbon copies of judicial opinions.4 ' The court stressed
that "any person could print, publish, and sell the reports of the
decisions of this court by purchasing the transcripts ... from the
clerk.",4' The court also ruled that, although copyright did not subsist
in judicial opinions, the state could claim copyright in the syllabi and
head-notes prepared by the official court reporter.46
38. Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898).
39. Id. at 130-31.
40. Id. at 138.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 140.
43. Id. at 137.
44. 78 N.E. 553 (Ind. 1906).
45. Id. at 558. See also Moore v. Sheppard, 192 S.W. 2d 559 (Tex. 1946) (holding that
clerks of Courts of Civil Appeals could supply uncertified, unofficial copies of court
opinions to commercial publishers without depositing their profits into the state treasury).
46. Brown, 78 N.E. at 558.
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Thus, by the end of the 19th century, courts in this country
established a common law rule that no copyright existed in the text of
statutes and judicial opinions, both on federal and state levels. In its
infancy, this rule did not rely either on English common law, or on
domestic legal authority. Instead, courts based their decisions on the
public policy principle that citizens should have uninhibited access to
the laws that govern them. In addition, in Banks v. Manchester, the
Supreme Court employed a statutory argument that the States did not
qualify as "authors" for purposes of copyright protection.47 This
argument was weakened when, at the turn of the century, U.S. courts
embraced the doctrine of "works made for hire" that granted
employers copyright in the original works of their employees. The
doctrine allowed states to claim copyright in works of state
employees. If the latter include state legislators and members of the
judiciary, the state arguably may claim copyright in their works.
B. The Doctrine of Works Made for Hire
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the "works made for hire"
doctrine in 1903, when it held that certain advertisements created by
an employee during the course of his employment belonged to his
employer.4" The 1909 Copyright Act codified the doctrine, providing
that authorship in works made for hire would vest in an employer.49
The federal statute did not define "works made for hire," but one of
the draft bills suggested that the term should include all works
"produced by an employee during the hours for which his salary is
paid, subject to any agreement to the contrary."50
The statutory definition emerged decades later, when the
Copyright Act of 1976 defined "works for hire" as (1) works prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment, or (2)
works commissioned for use in several specified categories. 1 In the
absence of the statutory definitions for "employee" and "the scope of
employment," courts have applied the common law of agency to
determine whether the master-servant relationship existed between
the parties, giving rise to the "works made for hire" doctrine. 2 Courts
have considered a number of factors including the degree of control
exercised by the employer over the manner in which the work was
47. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 249 (1888).
48. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
49. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88.
50. Conference on Copyright, Report, 3d Sess., 1906, at 13.
51. 17 U.S.C. §101.
52. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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produced, the nature and amount of compensation received by the
employee, and whether the work was created during work hours and
with the use of employer's facilities.
It can be argued that, as long as state legislators and members of
the judiciary receive salaries from the state and produce most of their
works within the scope of their defined duties, the state may claim
copyright in state legislative enactments and judicial decisions. In fact,
this approach has been adopted in the United Kingdom, where the
Crown owns copyright in the Acts of Parliament53 and, arguably, in
judicial opinions. 4 However, U.S. copyright law has expressly rejected
this idea. The 1909 Copyright Act -- the same statute that codified the
"works made for hire" doctrine - explicitly prohibited copyright in
any U.S. government publications.5 This statutory ban was later
incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976 that defined U.S.
government works as works "prepared by an officer or employee of
the United States Government as part of that person's official
duties. 56 In other words, the copyright law exempted federal
government works from the scope of the "works for hire" doctrine.
Even though the statutory ban applies only to federal
government works, the reasons underlying it could be convincingly
applied to state governments. During discussion of the copyright
revision bill in the 1960s, Melville Nimmer stated that copyright does
not exist in U.S. government works because they are produced with
public money. 7 The same could be said about works created by state
employees. In addition, a representative of the American Bar
Association, John Schulman, claimed that the government does not
own copyright in its works because, in democratic states, the
government is the people, while "the very essence of the copyright
theory is that it is the property of individual persons."58
The above analysis of the 19th century cases also demonstrates
53. Crown copyright exists in works made by "an officer or servant of the Crown in
the source of his duties." Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988, Ch. 48 § 163.
54. British copyright expert W.R. Cornish writes that, because judges are appointed
by royal authority, they are officers of the Crown, and therefore their judgments may be
subject to Crown copyright. See W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property 367 (1989).
55. "No copyright shall subsist in any publication of the United States Government
or any reprint, in whole or in part, thereof .... " Copyright Act of 1909 §7.
56. 17 U.S.C. §101.
57. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Part III, 89th
Cong. 1817 (1965) (statement of Melville Nimmer, University of California-Los Angeles
School of Law).
58. Id. at 1715 (statement of John Schulman, ABA).
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that U.S. courts routinely rejected copyright in state and federal laws
on the public policy grounds. Courts routinely held that people
should have uninhibited access to laws governing them - whether
these are state or federal laws. In the early and mid-20th century,
courts have accepted the common law rule against copyright in
statutes and judicial opinions without much argument or scrutiny. The
issue has been rarely litigated."
The latest development in the history of copyright protection for
statutory materials came in a series of cases regarding private
ownership of model codes incorporated into state and federal law.
Plaintiffs in these cases argued that privately created model codes
should fall into public domain when adopted by federal or state
agencies. However, to date, federal courts in several jurisdictions
were reluctant to strip private organizations of copyright in their
model codes.
C. Private Copyrights in State-Adopted Model Codes
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated a
preliminary injunction on unauthorized publication of a privately
created model building code that became part of the Massachusetts
law. In Building Code Officials & Code Administration v. Code Tech.,
Inc., the court stated that a model building code copyrighted by a
private organization might fall into public domain when adopted by
the state as its official code.60 The court advanced the "metaphorical
concept of citizen authorship," according to which state residents are
'authors' of state laws, regardless of who actually drafts statutory
provisions.61 "The law derives its authority from the consent of the
public, expressed through the democratic process, 62 the court
59. See State v. Mitchell, 74 P.2d 417 (Mont. 1937). The lawsuit was brought on behalf
of the State Publishing Company that lost a bid to publish Montana state court reports.
The suit alleged that the bidding terms were unlawful because they included the
requirement to furnish the state legislature with a complete set of the old, back numbers of
the Montana Reports. The plaintiffs claimed that this requirement effectively eliminated
the competition because only the company that held copyright in old volumes of the
Montana Reports could answer the terms of the bid. Id. at 419.
The court rejected this argument, saying, "[a]nything contained in an opinion
prepared and published by the court cannot be copyrighted." Id. at 424. "No part of a
decision as handed down by the court, or anything made a part of the decision when it is
sent to the publisher by the court, can be copyrighted." Id. Therefore, nothing precluded
other publishing companies from extending their labor and investments to make matrices
of previous court decisions.
60. 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 734.
62. Id.
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reasoned. The court also wrote that state administrative regulations,
like state statutes and judicial opinions, should be in the public
domain to secure citizens' due process rights including the right to
know the laws that govern them.63 However, the court did not
invalidate the private copyright in the building code, remanding the
case to a lower court for further hearing.
Fourteen years later, a similar case came to the attention of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In CCC Info. Services,
Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Market Reps., the federal appellate court
refused to invalidate a private copyright in the Red Book of used car
valuations despite the fact that several states referred to it in their
insurance codes. 6 The court explained that invalidation of private
copyright in model codes could raise "very substantial problems
under the Takings Clause of the Constitution."65 In addition, the court
stressed that, without copyright protection, private organizations will
lack economic incentive to engage in creation of model codes.
66
In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on
the Second Circuit's decision to uphold private copyright in a code of
medical procedures adopted by several federal agencies and the state
of California.67 In Practice Mgt Info. Corp. v. AMA, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument that a privately created medical coding system
lost its copyright protection by virtue of becoming the part of federal
and state regulations. The court stated that non-profit organizations
creating model codes would lose incentive to continue their activity, if
the codes fall into public domain when adopted by public agencies. 
6
The court also pointed to the lack of evidence that the public had
difficulty obtaining access to the medical coding system.69 In the
absence of a "realistic threat to public access," the court deemed it
against public policy interests to deprive the American Medical
Association of its copyright in the code.7"
The most recent case on point involved an unauthorized Internet
posting of a model building code that was adopted by several towns in
63. Id. at 734-735.
64. CCC Information Services, Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,
44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).
65. Id. at 74.
66. Id. at 74.
67. Practice Management Information Corp. v. AMA, 121 F. 3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 518-519.
69. Id. at 519.
70. Id. at 519.
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Texas." Peter Veeck, who operated a non-profit website with
information about Northern Texas, posted online the texts of local
building codes including the code created by the Southern Building
Code Congress International. The latter sued Veeck claiming that he
violated the group's copyright in the code. In response, Veeck argued
that the model code lost its copyright protection upon enactment into
public law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
copyright in the code, ruling that the public had reasonable access to
the code and that copyright was necessary to encourage private
organizations "to craft and update model codes."" However, the
court limited its decision to "the narrow set of facts 7 3 in the case,
stressing that, under different circumstances, the balance of interests
may tip in favor of invalidating copyright in the state-adopted codes.7"
Consequently, while the courts agree that no copyright exists in
the text of laws promulgated by state legislatures, several cases
indicate that privately created model codes retain copyright
protection even upon adoption into state laws. At the same time,
federal appellate courts in the First and Fifth Circuits stated that the
public has the right of reasonable access to state laws. If, in the future,
a private copyright in a model code creates obstacles to the
reasonable public access to law, courts might invalidate such
copyright for public policy reasons.
D. Copyright Act of 1976 and Protection of Compilations
Despite a common law rule against copyright protection of
primary law materials, collections of state statutes and judicial
opinions can still be protected under federal copyright law. The
Copyright Act of 1976, section 103, provides copyright protection for
compilations of preexisting material and derivative works.75 The
Copyright Act, section 101, defines a 'compilation' as "a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting material or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
71. Peter Veeck v. SBCCI, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1428 (5th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at *22.
73. Id. at *39.
74. In his dissent, Judge Little argued that adoption of the model code as state law
places this code into the public domain, so it could be readily accessible by all citizens. He
also argued that, upon enactment, "the law transforms into an idea that is no longer
distinguishable from its expression," thus losing copyright protection. Id. at *40.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 2000).
authorship. 7 6 Most collections of state statutes and judicial decisions,
together with the publisher's notes, references, and annotations,
would constitute compilations for purposes of copyright law.
The Copyright Act defines a 'derivative work' as a "work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship."77 Depending on a number and significance of editorial
revisions performed by commercial publishers prior to publishing
state codes, their collections of state statutes may also fall under the
definition of derivate works."
The law provides that "the copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material."79 In other words, copyright law protects only
original contributions of a compiler, or, as in Callaghan v. Myers, only
the matter resulting from the compiler's intellectual labor. A compiler
cannot claim copyright in any preexisting material, but only in its
arrangement, selection, and any additional features. The question is
which elements of compilations meet the requirements of originality
under the copyright law.
In the 1909 case Banks Law Publg. Co. v. Lawyers Co-operative
Publg. Co., 80 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that a publisher could not claim copyright in official state reports,
because his sequential arrangement of cases, pagination and
distribution of cases into volumes did not meet requirements of
originality under copyright law.81
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit came to an
opposite conclusion in 1985, holding that West's arrangement of cases
in the National Reporter System, including volume pagination,
deserved copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976.82 In
West Pubig. Co. v. Mean Data Central, the Eighth Circuit prevented
Mead Data from using West's "star pagination" system in the LEXIS
computer database. The court ruled that a work does not have to be
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary
Law, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 173, 194 (1998).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 2000).
80. 159 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909), (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 223 U.S. 738 (1911).
81. See id.
82. See West Pubig. Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571
(D. Minn. 1985).
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"novel or unique" to satisfy originality requirements under copyright
law. Instead, it has to merely originate with the author, or in other
words, to be "independently created."83
The requirements of originality became more stringent after the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Serv. Co.' In this case, the Court held that alphabetical
arrangement of telephone numbers in the white pages directory was
commonplace and trivial and did not deserve copyright protection.85
The Court ruled that, in order to be original, compilation has to attain
''some minimum level of creativity."
But even after the Feist decision, federal courts in different
jurisdictions fail to apply uniform standards in deciding the scope of
copyright protection for various compilation features. For instance, in
Oasis Publg. Co. v. West Publg. Co, 6 a Minnesota federal district
court supported West's claim of copyright in the case arrangement
and pagination system.87 To the contrary, in Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publg. Co.," a federal district court in New York ruled that the
West's pagination system did not deserve copyright protection for
lack of originality.89
Subsequently, a heated discussion about copyright protection of
primary law compilations unfolded among legal scholars. Deborah
Tussey, a former Michie's editor-in-chief of state codes, criticized a
recent trend in several federal circuits to afford copyright protection
to technical elements of primary law compilations, such as pagination,
section headings, and subject categories.' Tussey claimed that under
the 'merger doctrine,' copyright law does not protect features that are
inseparable from the basic legal texts.91 She also called for adoption of
a universal citation system as an alternative to West's pagination.'
At the same time, Tussey admitted that some elements of
compilations, including head-notes, annotations, digests, and
commentaries, deserve full copyright protection as long as they are
83. Id. at 1223.
84. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
85, Id.
86. 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996).
87. Id. at 925.
88. 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd 158 F. 3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
89. Id.
90. Tussey, supra n. 78, at 234.
91. Id. at 218-19.
92. Id. at 209.
original and non-trivial.93 She argued that, under Feist, comprehensive
compilations lack originality because they are mostly arranged by
alphabetical, chronological, or geographical order." To the contrary,
topical arrangements of legal materials may deserve more protection.
Law professors Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce argued that trivial
elements of compilations, such as page numbers in court reports and
section headings in statutory compilations, do not deserve protection
under both federal copyright law and the relevant case law.95 The
authors criticized the outcome of West Pubg. Co. v. Mead Data,
explaining that the Minnesota court "fatally confused copyright
infringement with unfair competition," and that section 301 of the
Copyright Act pre-empted state action against unfair competition.96
Citing a series of the 19th century cases, Patterson and Joyce
argued that the public should have unfettered access to the law in
both printed and electronic form, and that copyright should not
protect technical elements of primary law compilations.' "Copyright
should not be used to subject ideas or public domain expression to
captivity, regardless of the effort and investment made to combine
such matter into utilitarian products," the authors wrote.98
Legal librarian Francine Biscardi summarized the argument
about copyright in legal compilations by saying that this area of law
was "unsettled and controversial."' After a thorough analysis of the
prior case law, she came to conclusion that, while law itself is not
copyrightable, literary works embodying it are subject to copyright
protection.'0° Exactly how much protection courts afford to particular
compilations is decided on a case-by-case basis.
However, disagreements among courts pale in comparison to
different approaches adopted by state governments regarding
copyright in their primary law materials. The next section describes
the results of the author's 50 state study, which sought to identify
93. Id. at 220.
94. Id. at 221.
95. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719 (1989).
Justice O'Connor cited this article in the Feist's majority opinion.
96. Id. at 731, 777-781.
97. Id. at 731-45.
98. Id. at 808.
99. Francine Biscardi, The Historical Development of the Law Concerning Judicial
Report Publication, 85 L. Lib. J. 531, 544 (1993).
100. Id.
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specific statutory provisions providing for state copyright in statutory
codes, court reports, and administrative regulations.
II
State Statutes Providing for Copyright in Primary Law
Materials
A. Statutory Compilations and Other Legislative Materials
Many states protect compilations of their state laws, with four
states claiming very broad rights in their statutory codes. Only one
state, Illinois, expressly places its statutes in the public domain.
For instance, Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia claim
very broad copyright protection for compilations of state statutes.
Under Colorado law, the state claims copyright in Colorado Revised
Statutes and any ancillary publications" including softbound volumes
of newly enacted laws."° Another provision of Colorado state law
extends this protection to "all or any part" of official statutes by
prohibiting their publication, reprinting and distribution without a
prior permission from the committee on legal services.103 The state
penalizes unauthorized reproduction of state statutes by imposing a
$500 fine per each unauthorized book, volume, or computer
representation." The law provides exceptions to this strict rule by
allowing copying of parts of its statutes for personal use and for bona
fide teaching or educational purposes.
Georgia also claims a broad copyright protection for its statutory
code. The official Code of Georgia authorizes the state Code
Revision Commission to "register the copyright claim in all materials
in the Code and any supplements thereto. ' '° Under the state law, the
Code Revision Commission is responsible for preparation of
additional compilation features, such as cross-references, editor's
101. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-115 (West 1999). "Colorado Revised Statutes and
ancillary publications thereto, as published, shall be the sole property of the state of
Colorado as owner and publisher thereof and shall be copyrighted for and in behalf of the
state of Colorado by the secretary of state or the committee." Id.
102. Id. § 2-5-117.
103. Id. § 2-5-118(2)(a). "Any person, agency, or political subdivision desiring to
publish, reprint, or distribute, whether by use of printed matter or by use of computer or
other electronic means, all or any part of the statutes of the state of Colorado, with or
without the annotations thereto, must make prior written application to the committee [on
legal services]." Id.
104. Id. § 2-5-118 (5)(b).
105. Id. § 2-5-118 (1)(c).
106. Ga. Code Ann. § 28-9-3 (15) (1997).
notes, and historical notes." It is authorized to license government
and private entities to reprint and distribute excerpts of the Code."
Because the state claims copyright in its statutory code, the
commission has the power to license publication of the official code,
including annotations, in electronic format to a publisher other than
the book publisher of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated."l
Despite the broad statutory language, state courts have narrowed
the copyright protection of Georgia's official code. In the 1982 case
Georgia v. Harrison,"' a federal district court in Georgia refused to
enjoin publication of unauthorized statutory compilation, holding that
basic texts of state laws are in the public domain."' In addition, the
court ruled that the state could not claim copyright in statutory titles,
chapters, and article headings because they are brief and descriptive
elements that do not meet requirements of originality under the
copyright law."2 In 1979, the Supreme Court of Georgia also held that
the exclusive state contract for publication of official annotated code
did not prevent another publisher from printing a competitive
product."3 The court ruled that a competing publisher was free to
publish the state statutory code with his own original annotations."4
Mississippi also claims a sweeping copyright protection of its
official code. Under the Mississippi Code of 1972, the state retains
exclusive property rights in "all parts of any act" passed by the state
legislature and of any official code including, "without limitation,"
section numbers, articles, chapters, and titles."5 The state law provides
that commercial publishers of the code shall take copyrights in the
statutory compilation and promptly assign copyright to the state of
Mississippi."6
The state law prohibits not only unauthorized copying, but also a
107. Id. § 28-9-3 (9).
108. Id. § 28-9-3 (14).
109. Ga. Atty. Gen Op. U94-16 (Nov. 16, 1994) (available at 1994 WL 693315).
110. 548 F. Supp.110 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
111. Id. at 114. "[Sltates, like individuals, may not copyright what is in the public
domain." Id.
112. Id. at 115. "Brief, descriptive language used merely to designate or describe
something may not be copyrighted." Id.
113. Harrison v. Code Revision Commission, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979).
114. Id. at 34.
115. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-1-9 (2000).
116. Id. § 1-1-9(1). State contract for publication of supplement and replacement
volumes of the Mississippi Code provides that the publisher shall register the copyright
claim in all materials in supplements, indexes, replacement volumes, and tapes of the Code
on behalf and in the name of the state. Supplements shall include new statutory material,
judicial decisions construing the statutes, indexes, and references to secondary materials.
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mere use of state statutory materials without prior permission from
the joint legislative committee on compilation, revision and
publication of legislation."7 According to the state attorney general,
the code also is exempt from the state public records law. 18 The
penalty for unauthorized use of any part of the state code is a
minimum of $1,000 per day for each violation." 9
By trying to exercise exclusive control over the use of its
statutory materials, Mississippi legislature claims rights that exceed
the scope of protection granted to copyright owners under federal
copyright law.' Under the broad statutory language of the
Mississippi code, even practicing attorneys would have to secure
permission prior to citing statutory provisions in court papers or
arguments before the judge. In 1998, to avoid this confusion, the joint
legislative committee adopted a statement declaring that any person
is allowed to cite or refer to the Code section numbers, articles,
chapters or titles without prior permission of the joint committee.
Virginia is the only state that explicitly claims copyright in the
text of its statutes. Under state law, the Commonwealth of Virginia
retains exclusive property interest in "all parts of any code published
or authorized to be published by the State Code Commission,
including statute text, regulation text, catch lines, historical citations,
numbers of sections, articles, chapters and titles, frontal analyses and
revisor's notes.
''121
The state law provides that the text of the Virginia Code and the
state administrative code shall be available on the Internet. At the
same time, the law provides that, notwithstanding online publication,
a commercial publisher shall retain copyright in annotations, cross-
reference notes, editor's notes and other materials that the publisher
independently prepared and added to the code.'
117. Id. § 1-1-9 (3)(a) (2000).
118. Miss. Atty. Gen. Op., 1995 Miss. AG LEXIS 674, (Aug. 14, 1995). (The
Mississippi Code is exempt from the Public Records Act, because the law sets up a
comprehensive scheme for publication and distribution of the code to the public. In
addition, the law provides for public access to the code by requiring distribution of the
code to country libraries and the state law library. The public also has access to all papers
and records of the chancery clerk "during reasonable hours on business days.").
119. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-1-9 (3)(a) (2000).
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 2000). Copyright Act of 1976 §106 grants authors
exclusive rights to reproduce, to distribute, to prepare derivative works, to perform, and to
display the work to the public. Federal copyright law does not grant copyright owners the
exclusive right to control the use of a copyrighted work. Id.
121. Va. Code Ann. § 9-77.8 (A) (1998) (emphasis added).
122. Va. Code Ann. § 30-34.10:2 (1997).
123. Id.
Two states, Nevada and Pennsylvania, claim copyright in all
publications issued by the state, which may include both official
statutory compilations and court reports. Nevada law authorizes the
superintendent of state printing to secure copyright "under the laws
of the United States in all publications issued by the State of
Nevada." 4 In 1971, the state attorney general explained in an
advisory opinion that only state publications copyrighted in
compliance with the federal copyright law have a legally binding
copyright."5 This means that state materials published prior to 1978
without copyright notice are in the public domain and can be copied
without restrictions.
In addition, Nevada authorizes the state legislative counsel to
secure copyright in all publications issued by the legislative counsel
bureau."6 These publications include opinions of the legislative
counsel upon questions of law including existing law and pending
legislation which has become a matter of public record. 7
Similarly, Pennsylvania claims copyright in "all publications of
the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania], or of any department, board,
or commission or officer thereof, including the State Reports .. ,,128
In addition, the state law authorizes the superintendent of public
printing and binding to purchase from a copyright owner all
copyrights in the Smull's Legislative Hand Book and Manual of the
State of Pennsylvania and to legally assign the copyright to the
state.129
Several states including Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South
Dakota claim copyright in a specifically titled compilation of their
statutes. For instance, Idaho law provides that "the Idaho Code is the
property of the state of Idaho, and the state of Idaho and the
taxpayers shall be deemed to have a copyright on the Idaho Code."'3 °
This provision reflects the "metaphorical" theory of authorship
invoked in the Building Code case, under which the state citizens are
authors of the laws that govern them. Another statutory provision
specifies that a publishing company shall take copyright in "all
compilations" of the Code and assign the same to the state of Idaho. 3'
124. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.070 (1) (1999) (emphasis added).
125. Nev. Atty. Gen. Op. 3 (Jan. 11, 1971).
126. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218.698 (1996).
127. Id. § 218.695.
128. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 636 (i) (Supp. 2000).
129. 46 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 92 (1969).
130. Idaho Code § 9-350(1) (1998).
131. Idaho Code § 73-210 (1999) (emphasis added).
[23:81HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
2000] STATE OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS IN PRIMARY LAW MATERIALS 101
Under Idaho law, if a person reproduces the Code for "the
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage," he or she owes a
royalty payment to the Idaho Code commission in addition to any
copying fees."' The law provides that infringers shall be liable for
actual damages and profits or for statutory damages not to exceed
$10,000.113
Minnesota law instructs the revisor of statutes to send copies of
the Minnesota Statutes and supplements to the Library or Congress
"for copyright and depositary purposes." '134 Similarly, Nebraska law
instructs the revisor of statutes to copyright the statutory supplements
and reissued volumes of Nebraska statutes "under the copyright laws
of the United States for the benefit of the people of Nebraska." '135 The
state law also empowers the constitutional convention to secure a
copyright for publication of its proceedings.136
Under South Dakota law, neither state agencies,137  nor
individuals,138 may print or distribute copyrighted material from the
South Dakota Codified Laws without express permission of the state
code commission. Violation of state copyright is classified as a
misdemeanor.'39 However, the state law does not specify which
material from the statutory compilation shall be considered
copyrightable.
Four states - California, Kentucky, Michigan, and Oregon -
enacted similar provisions that secure the copyright interest of the
state in statutory and legislative materials posted on the Internet. For
instance, California law provides that the legislative counsel shall
make available to the public in electronic form the legislative
calendar, text of the bills, history, status, veto messages, and analyses
of the bills, vote information, the California Codes, the state
constitution, and all statutes enacted since 1993."0
Under Kentucky law, the legislative research commission shall
post online the state constitution, the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the
Kentucky Acts, and the state administrative regulations."' However,
132. Idaho Code § 9-350 (1) (1999).
133. Id. § 9-350(4).
134. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3C.12 (2)(m) (Supp. 2000).
135. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-707 (1998).
136. Id. § 49-225.
137. S.D. Codified Laws § 1-26-6.1 (Supp. 2000).
138. Id. § 2-16-8.1.
139. Id.
140. Cal. Gov. Code § 10248 (a) (Supp. 2000).
141. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7.500 (1) (1996).
under another statutory provision, state agencies are authorized to
charge fees for online access to their electronic records.142 This
provision applies to materials posted on the official state website.
Michigan law provides that the legislative council shall provide
the public with free Internet access to the Michigan Compiled Laws,143
the text of the Michigan Register, '" the text of the house and senate
journals,45 the text of bills'" and fiscal bill analysis.47
Similarly, Oregon law requires the legislative administration
committee to make available on the Internet the legislative calendar,
the text, history and status of each bill, vote information, the state
constitution, and all state laws enacted on or after September 9,
1995.48 In addition, Oregon law gives the committee discretion to
decide whether to release the text of the Oregon Revised Statutes in
electronic form.
149
All of the above state laws contain an identical provision
according to which online posting of the legislative materials does not
"alter or relinquish any copyright or other proprietary interest" of the
state in them.5° While this provision does not explicitly say whether
the states claim copyright in official compilations of their statutes.
However, the provision does indicates that the states do not intend to
forgo their copyright interests in the statutory and legislative
materials by making them available free of charge on the Internet.
A court in at least one state, Wisconsin, ruled in an unpublished
opinion that the state may claim copyright in features added by the
revisor of statutes to the official collection of Wisconsin laws.'5 ' In
142. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.874 (6) (2000) "Online access to public records in
electronic form ... may be provided and made available at the discretion of the public
agency. If a party wishes to access public records by electronic means and the public
agency agrees to provide online access, a public agency may require that the party enter
into a contract, license, or other agreement with the agency, and may charge fees for these
agreements." The official government website of Kentucky explicitly refers to this section.
See http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/home.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
143. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.1204(5) (2000).
144. Id. § 4.1203(5).
145. Id. § 4.1204(a)(1).
146. Id. § 4.1204(b)(1).
147. Id. § 4.1204(d)(1), (g)(1).
148. Or. Rev. Stat. § 173.763 (1998).
149. Id. § 173.763(2)(c). Oregon law also authorizes the legislative administration
committee to secure a copyright in "copyrightable materials developed, published or
produced by committee staff." Id. § 173.770.
150. Cal. Gov. Code § 10248(g) (2000 Supp.); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7.500 (7) (1996);
Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-1203(5), 4.1204 (2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 173.763 (6) (1998).
151. State of Wisconsin v. LOIS, Inc., 603 N.W.2d 748, 230 Wis. 2d 185 (Wis. App. 4th
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State of Wisconsin v. LOIS, Inc., the state court of appeals held that
material produced by the revisor of statutes, to accompany the text of
the statutes and administrative code, was not in the public domain
under either federal or state laws.
In this case, the state of Wisconsin and LOIS, Inc. signed a
contract that obliged LOIS, Inc. to pay $72,000 for the right to
reproduce revisor's compilation materials on a CD-ROM.13 However,
the commercial publisher failed to make the second payment,
claiming that the compilation material fell into the public domain. 4
The court disagreed with the publisher saying that the literary matter
at issue, including the preface to the statutory code, met "the
extremely low" requirement of originality under federal copyright
law.
155
The court also ruled that the absence of explicit statutory
language providing for the copyright of the revisor's compilation
materials did not necessarily imply the lack of copyright protection.'56
To the contrary, since the statute provided for the sale of the
statutory compilation, the state intended to profit from the sale, the
court held.'57 According to the court, this goal would be negated if the
statutes were in the public domain and anyone could reproduce
them.' Therefore, the Wisconsin court hinted that the state's
copyright interest in its statutes might be implied by the statutory
provision for the sale of statutory compilations.
One state, Illinois, denies copyright protection to the texts of
state statutes and accompanying compilation materials. Illinois law
explicitly provides that, "the Illinois Compiled Statutes, including the
statutes themselves and the organizational and numbering scheme...
shall be entirely in the public domain for purposes of federal
copyright law."'5 9 Similarly, Illinois holds in the public domain the
official compilation of the state administrative rules including its
codification system, indexes, tables, and other information location
aids.' 6
Dist. 1999), available at 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 946.
152. See id.
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id. at *10.
156. Id. at *14-15.
157. Id. at *15-16.
158. Id.
159. 25 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 135/5.04 (1993).
160. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 100/5-80(h) (1993).
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At the same time, Illinois may hold copyrights in other state
legislative materials. Illinois is one of the states that require online
publication of specified government materials, such as the schedule of
legislative floor sessions, text of bills, rules of the house and the
senate, text of public acts, the Illinois Compiled Statutes, the state
constitution, and the state administrative rules."' Like other similar
state statutes, Illinois law provides that online posting of the
legislative material shall not "alter or relinquish any copyright or
other proprietary interest or entitlement of the state relating to any of
the information" made available under the law. 2
Like Illinois, Texas does not favor copyright in state statutory
materials. In the late 1980s, the state launched an unsuccessful attack
on the copyright claimed by West Publishing Co. in the compilation
features of the state revised statutes. West and its predecessor,
Vernon Law Book Company, have collected, arranged, and published
Texas statutory law since 1914, claiming copyright in the article
numbers, headings, and arrangement of the Vernon's Annotated
Revised Civil Statutes.163 From 1941 to 1985, West also published the
state session laws.'" However, in 1985, Texas awarded the bid
contract for the printing of the session laws to the Bancroft-Whitney
Company.'65 The latter challenged West's copyright in the article
numbers and headings of the state statutory compilation.
In 1987, the state attorney general Jim Mattox supported the
challenge to West's copyrights by stating in his advisory opinion that
West could not claim copyright in the article numbers of the compiled
laws of Texas.'66 Mattox referred to the "established principle of
federal common law," according to which primary law materials lie in
the public domain.67 He also wrote that West's copyright in article
numbers was against the public interest, because citizens needed
"sensible access to Texas law."'"
The same year, Mattox and Bancroft-Whitney lobbied the state
legislature for official "adoption" of the Vernon's arrangement.1 69 The
161. 25 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 145/5.09 (1993).
162. Id. §145/5.09 (11).
163. See State of Texas v. West Publishing Co., 882 F. 2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1989).
164. Id. at 174.
165. Id.
166. Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., 163 Tex Reg. 1, (May 15, 1987) (available at LEXSEE 1987
Tex A6 LEXIS 163).
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 4.
169. See State of Texas v. West Publishing Co, 882 F. 2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Senate Bill 644 would have allowed other companies to use the
numbers and headings West has compiled for the state. After the
Texas legislature failed to pass the bill, Mattox filed suit in a federal
court seeking invalidation of the West's copyright in the statutory
compilation features.7 °
Mattox argued that the state has an obligation under the due
process clause to provide its residents with access to its laws and that
West's copyright impinges on this obligation. 7' However, both federal
district and appellate courts refused to consider the case for the lack
of "actual controversy." In State of Texas v. West Publishing Co., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that it lacked a
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the parties were not
in adversarial conflict with each other.' In fact, West has never
indicated its intention to sue the state of Texas for infringement of
West's copyrights. Consequently, the state's attempts to invalidate
West's copyright in the statutory compilation featured proved to be
unsuccessful.
B. Court Reports
Statutes in at least 14 states provide copyright protection for
state court reports. Most of the states claim copyright in volumes or
compilations of the court reports; none of the states claim copyright
in the opinions of judges. At least one state, Kentucky, specifically
provides in its statutes that "there shall be no copyright of the
Supreme Court opinions. '
Seven states - Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio,
Rhode Island, and West Virginia - claim copyright in the bound
volumes of court reports. For instance, Kansas's law requires the state
supreme court reporter to secure copyright in each volume of court
reports "for the use and benefit of the state of Kansas."'74 In 1981, the
state attorney general explained in the written opinion that copyright
protection of court reports is limited to "the parts which represent the
reporter's or publisher's own work and labor in production and does
not cover the opinions or other material prepared by the judges in the
170. State of Texas v. West Publishing Co., 681 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd,
882 F. 2d 171 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
171. 882 F. 2d at 177.
172. 882 F. 2d at 171.
173. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 21A.070(4) (1992) (This statement does not exclude a copyright
in compilations of judicial opinions.).
174. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-206 (1995).
discharge of their judicial duties."''
The attorney general wrote that reports can be copyrighted only
as compilations and derivative works under section 103(b) of the
federal Copyright Act. The copyrightable material would include
indexes, tables, and the actual compilation of cases. The opinion also
stated that reports published without copyright notice prior to 1978
had forfeited their copyright and fell into the public domain.
Michigan law provides that a publisher of the state supreme
court reports "shall take out no copyright except to the secretary of
state for the use and disposal of the state, upon any volume
published" under the contract. 76 In 1955, the state attorney general
explained that, under this law, decisions of the supreme court are free
to publication by all, but the text of the syllabi, head-notes, footnotes,
indexes and references prepared by the court reporter and the
publisher are protected by copyright.
Under Minnesota law, printed volumes of the supreme court
reports "shall be copyrighted by the secretary of state in trust for the
people.'77 The volumes shall include indexes, tables of cases, and
"other matter necessary to complete the volume."'78
In Nebraska, the state constitution provides that "the copyright
of the state reports shall forever remain the property of the state.',
9
In addition, the state statute, dating back to 1879, requires the
supreme court reporter to copyright for the benefit of the state
volumes of the Nebraska Supreme Court reports and the Court of
Appeals reports.'O
In the 1906 case State of Nebraska v. State Journal Co., 8' the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a publisher did not breach the
contract with the state by printing extra copies of court reports for its
own profit, because reports were in the public domain and free to
copying by all. The court held that the supreme court opinions
entered the public domain before their publication by the state
contractor because the state newspapers regularly published the
syllabi and excerpts of the opinions as soon as the decisions were
rendered. The court also stressed that the state's primary purpose in
175. Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. 81-48 (Feb 17, 1981) (available at 1981 Kan. AG
LEXIS 245).
176. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.376 Sec. 6 (LEXIS L. Publ'g. 2000).
177. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 480.11(3) (Supp. 2000).
178. Id.
179. Neb. Const., art. 5 § 8.
180. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-212 (1995).
181. 77 Neb. 752 (Neb. 1906).
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publishing court opinions was to make them "easily accessible to all
the citizens," not to receive profit upon sale to benefit the state
library.
Ohio law provides that the supreme court reporter shall secure a
copyright for the use of the state in bound volumes of the reports of
the supreme court, the court of appeals, and of inferior courts." The
reports shall contain an index, a table of cases, a list of citations, and
other proper tabulation.183
The Rhode Island law requires the supreme court reporter to
assign to the secretary of state, for the use of the state, the copyright
of each volume of the supreme court reports." Similarly, under West
Virginia law, the official reporter of the supreme court of appeals
shall secure copyright of the bound volumes and advance sheets of
the West Virginia Reports.85 The volumes shall contain an index and
a table of cases.9 6
Two states, Illinois and New York, provide in their statutes a
non-exhaustive list of the compilation features protected by state
copyright. For example, Illinois law provides that the state supreme
court shall take copyright "of the statements of facts, of the syllabi, of
the index and of all other notes and references prepared by the
reporter of decisions."'"
The New York law provides that the secretary of state must take
copyright in the statements of fact, head-notes and "all other notes
and references prepared by the law reporting bureau" in court
reports." In 1964, the attorney general explained that the text of
court opinions is in the public domain and free for copying by all. 89
At the same time, additional features, such as statements of fact,
head-notes and other matter prepared by the law reporting bureau,
are copyrighted and cannot be used for commercial purposes."9
The statutory codes of other states, such as Georgia, Maryland,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee, provide a general copyright
182. Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2503.23 (1991).
183. Id.
184. "[H]e or she (the reporter].., shall assign to the secretary of state, for the use of
the state, the copyright of the volume, if it shall have been copyrighted." R.I. Gen. Laws §
8-1-8 (1997).
185. W. Va. Code § 5A-3-23 (2000).
186. Id.
187. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 65/5 (1999).
188. N.Y. Jud'ry Laws § 438 (1999).
189. N.Y. Atty. Gen. Op. (July 21, 1964).
190. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
protection for court reports, without specifying whether the state
claims copyright in bound volumes as a whole, or only in specific
compilation features added by a court reporter. For instance, under
Georgia law, "[t]he [court] reports shall be copyrighted and the
copyright shall belong to the state.''. Maryland law requires the state
court reporter to "secure copyright for the state of Maryland" in
reports of cases decided by the state court of appeals and in the court
of special appeals. 92
New Hampshire authorizes the state court reporter to dispose of
the copyright of court reports "as he shall deem expedient.'
93
Tennessee law provides that after five years from the publication of
reports, their copyright shall revert to the state."' No court
interpretations of the above statutes were available at the time of
research.
C. Administrative Rules
At least five states - Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
and Oregon - claim copyright interest in the compilations of their
administrative rules. For instance, Florida requires the state
department to retain the copyright in the Florida Administrative
Code. 95 The Code is an official compilation of the state administrative
rules and comprises all rules adopted by each agency, history notes,
and complete indexes to the rules.
In a similar vein, Kentucky law provides for exclusive publication
of the state administrative regulations by the state legislative research
commission.'96 Minnesota requires the state revisor of statutes to
copyright compilations and supplements of all permanent agency
rules in the name of the state.97 The compilations of agency rules shall
include the rules and appropriate tables, annotations, references,
explanatory notes, and indexes.
Oklahoma law is very specific about the elements of the state
administrative code that are protected by copyright. Under state law,
the state owns a property interest in the codification system of the
administrative code, derivations, cross references, notes of decisions,
source notes, authority notes, numerical lists, and codification
191. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-34 (1999).
192. Md. Cts. & Jud'l Procs. Code Ann. § 13-203 (1999).
193. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 505:9 (1997).
194. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-6-204 (1993).
195. Fla. Stat. § 120.55 (1)(a) (2000).
196. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13A.060 (1) (1996).
197. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 14.47 (5) (1999).
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guides.19 To the contrary, there is no copyright in the actual text of
administrative rules, indexes, tables, and other aids relevant to the
publication of the code and register 9 The law also allows incidental
reproduction of copyrighted material together with the text of the
rule for private use of an individual, but not for resale.2"
Oregon also claims copyright in its administrative rules by
authorizing the secretary of state to copyright the compilation of
agency rules, called the Oregon Administrative Rules.)' In addition,
under state law, the secretary of state shall make administrative rules
available to the public on the Internet.2 0 The statute says, this
electronic posting shall not relinquish any copyright interest the state
may have in its administrative rules. 3
Research of state statutes has revealed that many states claim
copyright interest in their primary law materials, such as statutory
compilations, court reports, and administrative regulations. The scope
of copyright protection differs from state to state. It ranges from
broad copyright claims in all and any parts of statutory codes to




State governments have several incentives to claim copyright in
primary law materials. First, copyright allows States to ensure
accurate reproduction of their laws. In other words, copyright
protection could help in preventing unauthorized alterations of state
statutes. Georgia's government made this argument in trying to
prevent Harrison Publishing Company from printing an unauthorized
compilation of Georgia state statutes.2 ' However, a federal district
court in Georgia did not find this argument compelling, holding that it
is up to the people to decide whether they want to take a risk of using
unofficial compilation of state laws. 5 The court stressed that any
person citing the U.S. Code Annotated and the U.S. Code Service
198. Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 256(F)(1) (2000).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.360 (1) (1998).
202. Id. § 183. 365 (1).
203. Id. § 183. 365 (7).
204. Georgia v. Harrison Publ'g. Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
205. Id. at 115.
takes the same risk because both of these codifications are unofficial
and published by private commercial publishers. °8
Second, copyright provides economic incentive for commercial
publishers to engage in publication of state legal materials. Publishers
need some type of reimbursement for their considerable efforts and
financial investments in collecting, editing, arranging, and publishing
state legal materials. If any person can appropriate free of charge the
results of their labor, commercial publishers, arguably, will have no
incentive to engage in the business of publishing state legal materials.
As a result, the public would be denied access to state statutes and
judicial opinions altogether.
Third, by licensing reproduction and distribution of their official
law compilations, states can generate revenue in the form of royalty
payments, copying fees, and hefty fines imposed on those who violate
state copyright interests. For instance, in 1906, Nebraska tried to
persuade its Supreme Court that copyrighting court reports was
necessary to raise money for the state library fund.0 7 The court
denied this argument saying that the state's primary purpose in
publishing court decisions is to make them accessible to the public,
not to generate revenue.2O8
The development of new technologies, including CD-ROM and
the Internet, provided new incentives for state governments to claim
copyright in their legal materials. Compilations of state legal
materials become even more valuable when presented in electronic
form. Private companies and individuals are often willing to pay for
the right to use electronic products because they make it easier to find
and access various legal data. The state of Kentucky makes it
unlawful to use information available on its website for commercial
purposes without agreement with the Legislative Research
Commission. °9 California, Michigan, and Oregon have adopted laws
safeguarding the state's property interest in their primary law
materials published on the Internet. 210 Other states put a copyright
sign at the bottom of their web pages, which could mean that they
claim copyright in the online display of their legal materials."
206. Id.
207. Nebraska v. State Journal Co., 110 N.W. 763, 764 (Neb. 1906).
208. Id.
209. See <http://www.lrc.state.ky.usfhome.htm> (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
210. See Cal. Gov. Code § 10248 (Supp. 2000); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 2.138 (203-204)
(2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 173.763 (Supp. 1998).
211. See, e.g. Alabama Legislative Information Home Page at
<http://www.legislature.state.al.us/ALISHome.html>; see also State of Wyoming home
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Finally, states may seek to control the use of their primary law
materials. For instance, several states require third parties to obtain
permission of special legislative commissions prior to reproducing
portions of the statutes.212 At the same time, state laws do not provide
for compulsive licensing - a system under which the state would be
obliged to license reproduction of its statutes upon payment of
reasonable fees. In the absence of compulsive copyright licensing, the
state legislative commissions have sole discretion to approve, deny, or
impose restrictions on the third-party use of state statutes. Therefore,
at least in theory, there is an opportunity for abuse of discretion,
when legislative commissions would license the use of state statutes to
some companies and deny requests of others.
However, there are strong constitutional and statutory
arguments why state primary law materials should be in the public
domain. Under the constitutional copyright clause, Congress has the
power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ''213 It has been
widely acknowledged that the U.S. copyright law promotes the
progress of science and the arts by providing authors with economic
incentives to engage in creative activities.' It can be argued that state
governments and courts do not need economic incentives to
promulgate new laws or write judicial opinions. State legislators and
judges will continue performing their duties - enacting new laws and
rendering judgments - regardless of whether they receive copyright
royalties or not. The U.S. Supreme Court stated this principle more
than a century ago in Callaghan v. Myers, holding that copyright
could not exist in the work done by judges "in their official capacity
as judges.,
21 1
In addition, the state's control over the use of its primary law
page at <http://www.state.wy.us/government.html>.
212. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-5-118 (2)(a) (2000.) (requiring third parties to obtain
permission of the Committee on Legal Services,); Ga. Code Ann. § 28-9-3 (14) (1997)
(authorizing the state Code Revision Commission to grant rights to government and
private entities to reprint and distribute excerpts of the state Code,); Washington State
Legislative Information at <http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/ses.htm> (stating that the
Washington State Statute Law Committee claims copyright in both the Revised Code of
Washington and the Washington Administrative Code).
213. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
214. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983).
215. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617,647 (1888).
materials may violate the constitutional due process clause.216 In
Building Code Officials, the First Circuit stated that state citizens
have the due process right of access to statutes and judicial
opinions.217 The court said, "due process requires people to have
notice of what the law requires of them so they may obey it and avoid
its sanctions."2 '8 By claiming exclusive control over reproduction and
distribution of their primary law materials, state may hinder public
access to important legal documents. According to Melville Nimmer,
"failure to observe such due process notice requirements would
certainly constitute a defense for one charged with violation of the
nonpublicized law." '219
The federal copyright law also may preclude state copyright in
primary law materials. For instance, under the Copyright Act of 1976
copyright could exist only in "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression ....,220 In regard to a state's
ownership of copyright, the question may arise - who is the author of
a state statute or administrative regulation? Many people participate
in the process of drafting and passing a statute - citizens, lobbyists,
and interest groups come up with proposals for changes in law,
legislative staff drafts initial text of a bill, individual legislators and
legislative committees negotiate the bill's provisions, and, finally,
members of state legislature have to vote to enact a bill into law.
Likewise, many people participate in drafting administrative
regulations - staff members of administrative agencies may write the
initial text of a regulation, which is then presented for comment to the
public at large. Since there are many people involved in the process of
legislating or rulemaking, who should be considered an author for
purposes of copyright law?
Alternatively, should legislative enactments be considered works
of joint authorship, defined in the Copyright Act as works "prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole"?2 ' However, legislative enactments often present a
compromise among various political entities that have different
agendas. People who initially proposed a change in law may disprove
216. U.S. Const., amend. V "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
217. Building Code Officials, 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
218. Id.
219. Nimmer, supra n. 5, at § 5.06[C] at 5-92.
220. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (Supp. 2000).
221. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 2000).
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of the final language adopted by the legislature. In this context,
parties may not have the initial intention "that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole. 222 Absent this initial intention, legislative works might not
qualify as "joint works" under the Copyright Act.
The authorship of state judicial opinions is unclear as well.
Courts in the United States have held repeatedly that neither judges
nor court clerks can claim copyright in judicial opinions because they
are employees of the state, and the state compensates them for their
labors.223 Under the "works made for hire" doctrine, the State, as an
employer, could claim copyright in works produced by its employees
including state judges. However, this notion would threaten judicial
independency and run afoul of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers.
Some courts tried to address the question of authorship in
primary law materials by embracing a "metaphorical concept of
citizen authorship." For instance, in Building Code Officials, the First
Circuit ruled that state citizens are "authors" of state laws, regardless
of who actually drafts statutory provisions.22 As "authors," citizens
can freely reproduce and distribute state laws. A federal trial court in
Minnesota expressed the same idea a century ago in Banks v. West
Publ'g Co., holding that, in the United States, "each citizen is a ruler,
- a law-maker, - and as such has the right of access to the laws he
joins in making and to any official interpretation thereof.
' 25
However, the "metaphorical concept of citizen authorship" may
not be the best answer to the question of state copyright ownership.
Under this concept, authorship belongs to citizens of the state
because they participate in the state election process, pay taxes, and
have to abide by state laws. This necessarily means that citizens of
other states and foreigners could not claim authorship in the state's
legislative enactments. Therefore, while state citizens would have
unfettered access to the state's primary law materials, citizens of other
states and foreigners would have to secure the state's permission to
reproduce these materials. For instance, Idaho codified the concept of
citizen authorship by providing in its statute that, "the state of Idaho
and the taxpayers shall be deemed to have a copyright on the Idaho
222. Id.
223. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834); Gould v. Banks, 2 A. 886, 896
(1886); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
224. Building Code Officials, 628 F.2d at 734.
225. 27 F. at 57.
Code." '226 The literal reading of the Idaho law could mean that all
Idaho taxpayers, as "authors" of the state code, can reproduce it free
of charge. However, others - citizens of other states and foreigners -
would have to secure the state's permission prior to reproducing the
Idaho Code. This solution does not seem practical in a country such
as the United States where the population is very mobile. Americans
travel for personal and business purposes all over the country and
may need access to laws in other states as well as they need access to
the laws in their own state of residence.
In addition, statutes securing the state's exclusive control over its
legal materials may violate the fair use provision of the federal
copyright law. The doctrine of fair use, codified in section 107 of the
Copyright Act, permits unauthorized use of copyrighted works for
special purposes, such as teaching, research, criticism, and news
reporting.227 Under federal law, courts have to take into consideration
several factors in deciding whether the use of a copyrighted work in
any particular case is a fair use. These factors include: (a) the purpose
and character of the use, (b) the nature of the copyrighted work, (c)
the amount and substantiality of the copied portion, and (d) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. 8
The fair use doctrine requires the states to allow unauthorized
reproduction of portions of their copyrighted materials in particular
circumstances, including reproduction for purposes of scholarship,
news reporting, and comment. Colorado incorporated the fair use
provision in its statutes by allowing unauthorized copying of portions
of its code for personal use and for bona fide teaching and
educational purposes. 9 At the same time, Virginia and Mississippi
claim very broad copyright protection of their statutes, but do not
provide for fair use of their primary law materials. For instance,
Virginia claims copyright in the very text of its statutes and
regulations without providing for any fair use exceptions.23° Likewise,
Mississippi prohibits the mere use of its statutory materials without
prior permission from the legislative committee.23'
However, federal copyright law takes precedence over any state
copyright provisions. Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that
federal copyright law applies to all works of authorship that are
226. Idaho Code § 9-350 (1999).
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 2000).
228. Id.
229. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-5-118 (1)(c) (2000).
230. Va. Code Ann. § 9-77.8 (A) (1997).
231. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-1-9 (3)(a) (2000).
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subject to copyright.232 The statute provides, "Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such [exclusive] right or equivalent right in any such
work [work of authorship] under the common law or statutes of any
states.,233 This means that federal copyright law supersedes both
common law and the state copyright provisions. Therefore, even
though a state may not provide for fair use of its primary law
materials, federal copyright law mandates the state to allow fair use in
particular circumstances. As a result, the statutes of Virginia and
Mississippi may violate the fair use provision of the Copyright Act.
Even more importantly is that the state's ownership of copyright
in primary law materials runs afoul of the fundamental public policy
principle that citizens in a democratic society must have uninhibited
access to the laws. For more than 100 years, U.S. courts relied on the
public policy considerations to deny the states copyright ownership in
the texts of state statutes and judicial opinions. In Georgia, a federal
district court went as far as denying on public policy grounds
copyright protection for elements of statutory compilation, such as
section headings and titles.235 The First Circuit stated in Building Code
Officials, that even administrative regulations should lay in the public
domain.236 Legal scholars also have argued that public policy
considerations require free reproduction of technical features
including arrangement of statutes and cases, as well as page and
section numbering.237 So far, only two states have responded
statutorily to these concerns. Illinois law provides that the Illinois
Code and administrative regulations are in the public domain for
purposes of the federal copyright law.238 In addition, Kentucky law
provides that, "there shall be no copyright of the Supreme Court
opinions."239
Most states still claim some copyright interest in their statutory
codes, court reports, or administrative regulations. Many states do not
specify which elements of statutory codes and court reports are
protected by copyright. For instance, Georgia law contains a short
provision that "[court] reports shall be copyrighted and the copyright
232. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 2000).
233. Id.
234. See Part I of the article, "Common Law and Public Policy on Copyright in
Primary Law Materials."
235. Georgia v. Harrison, 548 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N. D. Ga. 1982).
236. 628 F.2d at 734.
237. See generally Tussey, supra n. 78; Patterson and Joyce, supra n. 95, at 736-39.
238. See 25 I11. Comp. Stat. § 135/5.04 (1999); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 100/5-80(h) (1999).
239. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21A.070 (4) (1992).
shall belong to the state." 4' Similarly, Pennsylvania copyrights "all
publications of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania], or any
department, board, or commission or officer thereof, including the
State Reports."2 ' The constitution of Nebraska also provides that,
"copyright of the state reports shall forever remain the property of
the state." '242
These broad pronouncements of the states' copyright interest in
the primary law materials shall be interpreted narrowly to comply
with the requirements of constitutional due process and the common
law. The well-established common law principle denies copyright
protection to basic legal texts. Under common law, states can claim
copyright only in original elements of their legal compilations, which
reflect intellectual labor on the part of a compiler. These elements
would include annotations, editor's notes, and references, but would
not include basic texts of statutes or judicial opinions.
Meanwhile, a layperson unfamiliar with 19th century common
law would not know this principle and could possibly think that, by
claiming copyright interest in its code, a state was attempting to
protect all the materials in the code, including the text. There are at
least three ways to avoid this confusion. First, the state statute may be
challenged in court. This happened in Georgia, where a federal
district court held the basic texts of state laws to be in the public
domain.243 However, in the absence of a judicial decision, the broad
statutory provisions remain the law of the state and govern the public
use of state laws. This creates an undesirable situation when citizens
have to comply with statutory provisions that would be considered
invalid if challenged in court.
Second, state legislatures could amend their laws by providing
explicitly that the basic texts of state statutes, regulations, and judicial
opinions are in the public domain. Arguably, unoriginal elements of
legal compilations, such as chronological and geographical case
arrangement, page numbering, and title headings, also should be
exempt from copyright protection.
Finally, Congress can amend section 105 of the Copyright Act of
1976 to provide that copyright protection is not available for texts of
state statutes, judicial opinions, and possibly administrative
regulations. This amendment would not change existing law - it
240. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-34 (1998).
241. 71 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 636(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
242. Neb. Const., Art. 5, § 8.
243. Harrison v. Code Revision Commission, 260 S.E. 2d 30 (Ga. 1979).
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would merely codify the common law principle applied by the courts
since the 19th century. Congress also may consider enacting a
prospective statute prohibiting copyright in those elements of primary
law compilations that are indispensable to the use of basic legal texts.
This would include section numbers and title headings in statutory
compilations, and page numbers in court reports.
Such amendment would remedy a somewhat 'anomalous'
situation in federal copyright law, when courts rely on the common
law precedent, rather than on the federal statutory law in deciding
cases of state copyright ownership. In its first copyright case, Wheaton
v. Peters, the U.S. Supreme Court held that copyright exists in the
United States not as a common law right, but as a statutory privilege:
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United State...
There is no principle which pervades the union and has the
authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of
the union. The common law could be made a part of our federal
system, only by legislative adoption. 24
This means that, in deciding copyright questions, courts should
be guided by federal copyright statutes. However, when it comes to
the state ownership of copyrights, federal law provides little guidance,
and courts repeatedly turn to the common law authority.
The common law authority on state ownership of copyrights is
not entirely satisfactory either. The key argument employed by the
courts throughout the 19th and 20th century is a public policy
consideration that, in a democratic society, citizens should have
unfettered access to the laws. But public policy pronouncements are a
unique prerogative of the legislative branch. In addition, public policy
is not cast in stone - what was considered a sound public policy in the
19th century may not be as sound two hundred years later. A series of
cases involving privately created model codes present a perfect
example of how public policy priorities change over time. When
deciding the copyright status of state-adopted model codes, courts
were balancing two public interests - "on the one hand, encouraging
innovation through copyright and, on the other hand, ensuring free
access to the law. 215 Departing from the 19th century precedent,
federal appellate courts in the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits upheld
private copyrights in the model codes that became an integral part of
state law. The courts justified their policy judgment on the ground
that private organizations save governments time and money by
creating model codes. However, it is not entirely clear why
244. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. at 658.
245. Peter Veeck v. SBCCI, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1428 at *17 (5th Cir. 2001)
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governments cannot provide monetary compensation to creators of
model codes instead of granting them private ownership in public
laws.246 Consequently, if uninhibited public access to laws remains an
important public policy consideration, Congress is best equipped to
codify this principle making it legally binding on state legislatures and
courts.
In addition, the change in federal copyright laws would bring
uniformity to state laws on copyright. Currently, different states claim
various degrees of protection in their legal materials. For instance,
Mississippi protects "all parts of any act" passed by the state
legislature,247 while New York specifically protects the statements of
fact, head-notes, notes, and references in its court reports. 8 The lack
of uniformity in state copyright laws may deter some creative activity.
For instance, an author may wish to publish a comprehensive study of
state laws regulating public access to government documents. In order
to include all relevant statutory provisions in the book, the author
would have to ask each of the 50 states whether they claim copyright
in section numbers and title headings of their codes. If some states
protect these elements, the author would have to secure permission
for their use from designated legislative bodies and possibly pay
copyright royalties. If the author ventures to include statutory
provisions without the states' authorization, she may face hefty fines.
For instance, Mississippi imposes a $1,000 daily fine on unauthorized
uses of its code.249 The daunting task of securing copyright permission
from each state for the use of its statutory provisions could deter an
author from undertaking and publishing her research.
The same problem would arise if an Internet user were to decide
to place hyperlinks to the text of state laws on that user's website. If
the state protects the online display of its laws, Internet users may
need to secure the state's permission prior to downloading excerpts of
the code.
By amending section 105 of the federal Copyright Act, Congress
would promote uniformity in state ownership of copyright, providing
incentive for publication of comprehensive studies of state laws. The
amendment would also ensure free public access to primary law
246. Id. at *40 "It is antithetical to our nation's concept of public participation for a
private entity to monopolize the public laws." (District Judge Little, dissenting)
247. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-1-9(2) (1999).
248. N.Y. Jud'ry Laws § 438 (1999).
249. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-1-9(3)(a) (1999).
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materials in the states and would prevent possible abuse of discretion
by state authorities with copyright licensing power.
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